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Abstract
This paper considers eects of body mass on wages in the years
following labor market entry. The preferred models allow current
wages to be aected by both past and current body mass, as
well as past wages, while also addressing the endogeneity of body
mass. I nd that a history of severe obesity has a large negative
eect on the wages of white men. White women face a penalty
for a history of being overweight, with additional penalties for
both past and current BMI that begin above the threshold for
severe obesity. Furthermore, the eects of past wages on current
wages imply that past body mass has additional, indirect eects
on wages, especially for white women.
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This paper considers eects of past and current body mass on wages in the
early years of workers' careers. Using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1997, I estimate dynamic models of wages in which body
mass is allowed to be endogenous. This approach allows workers' history in
the labor market, including past wages, to aect current wages. As a result,
eects of high body mass can accumulate and persist over time. Furthermore,
the preferred estimates are unbiased even when body mass is correlated with
both individual xed eects and time-varying unobservables.
The literature on body mass and wages has been understandably con-
cerned with the endogeneity of body mass. Cawley (2004) carefully describes
the reasons weight or body mass may be correlated with xed and time-
varying unobserved heterogeneity; however, most previous work has focused
on either individual xed eects or time-varying sources of endogeneity, but
not both in the same regression.1
One contribution of this paper is that the estimation addresses multiple
sources of bias simultaneously. The use of autoregressive wage equations
eliminates a potential source of omitted variable bias that has been ignored by
previous work, and individual xed eects are removed by rst-dierencing.
The panel data are then exploited to address endogeneity associated with
1E.g., Han et al. (2011) use xed eects. Baum and Ford (2004) use rst dierences.
Kline and Tobias (2008) use parent's BMI as an instrument. Cawley (2004) and Sabia
and Rees (2012) use xed eects and IV in separate regressions.
Two exceptions, Averett and Korenmann (1996) and Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001),
use dierencing to remove sibling (or twin) xed eects and then use lagged BMI as either
a proxy or an instrument for current BMI.
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remaining, time-varying errors.
Another important contribution of this paper is the estimation of models
that are consistent with discrimination aecting labor market search, occu-
pational sorting or other channels that would imply dynamic eects of body
mass on wages. The preferred specications allow both current and past
body mass to aect wages. Furthermore, wages are aected not only by the
lags of body mass included in the model, but also by further lags that have
indirect eects through their eects on past wages. As a result, eects of
body mass on wages can persist and even accumulate over time. In contrast,
most previous work implicitly assumes that wage penalties associated with
obesity are the same whether the worker recently became obese or had been
obese her entire career.2
This paper is also the rst in the literature to use the NLSY97, and one
of the rst to focus on workers who entered the labor market more recently
than the 1980s.3 Odgen et al. (2010) report that obesity doubled among
adults in the U.S. between 1980 and 2000. If prejudice or stereotypes evolve
as the population becomes heavier, results from previous work based on the
NLSY79 may not generalize to more recent cohorts.4
2Recent work by Chen (2012) is the only other to allow both past and current BMI
to aect wages. Examining workers in their 30s, she considers eects of current BMI and
BMI 10 years earlier. The current paper provides a detailed look inside of those early
years using a younger cohort of workers.
3Sabia and Rees (2012) use a sample from Add Health that is between 24 and 32 in
2008. Gregory and Ruhm (2011) also use data with more recent entrants, but their sample
from the PSID pools respondents as young as 25 in 2005 and as old as 55 in 1986.
4Additionally, Altonji et al. (2012) nd that the mix of skills and family backgrounds
changed between NLSY cohorts, which would aect the ability to generalize across decades.
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Finally, the estimation sample is unique in its focus on young workers in
the rst several years after entry into the labor market. As a result, the esti-
mation should be better able to capture potential discrimination as it unfolds
than it would with a sample of older workers. Wage growth is higher earlier in
careers, and changes in jobs and occupations are more important.5 Removing
xed eects in a sample of older workers is likely to remove the accumulated
eects of past discrimination suggested by Chen (2012). Furthermore, sig-
nals inferred from body mass should have larger eects for younger than for
older workers because the market knows less about younger workers.6
The empirical results suggest that wages are aected by past body mass
and past wages. White men are penalized for a history of severe obesity.
White women face a penalty for being overweight in previous years, with
additional penalties as either past or current BMI exceeds the threshold
for severe obesity. Furthermore, I nd that including past wages in the
model is critical for identication and has important implications for the
interpretation of results, especially for women.
The next section discusses models of wages and body mass, building up
to dynamic panel data specications. Section 2 discusses the data. Section 3
5See Murphy and Welch (1992), Topel and Ward (1992), and Neal (1999) among others.
6Hamermesh (2011) provides a similar argument to explain why eects of beauty on
wages might decline with age. See Altonji and Pierret (2001) for more on statistical
discrimination in the presence of employer learning. Lange (2007) discusses how quickly
the market learns about young workers.
Employer learning about healthcare costs may be more complicated than learning about
productive characteristics if the correlation between BMI in a given period and expected
healthcare costs changes with age.
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describes tests of the identifying assumptions introduced in Section 1 before
discussing other details of the estimation. Section 4 presents results, followed
by various robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
1 Empirical Models of Body Mass and Wages
Following the recent literature, our rst attempt at specifying a wage regres-
sion to measure eects of body mass might take the form
wit = Xit +BMIit+ it; (1)
where wit is the log of person i's wage in period t; Xit is a vector of observable
characteristics, and BMIit is a vector that describes body mass using dummy
variables or a polynomial. BMIit is potentially correlated with both xed
individual eects related to genetics or upbringing and time-varying factors
in the error term, it, leading to possible endogeneity.
Some previous work has used xed eects or rst-dierenced estimation
to eliminate bias in equation (1), but potential correlation between BMIit
and time-varying shocks to wages then remains.7 Other estimates used in-
strumental variables to address the bias in equation (1), but the instruments
used so far in the literature are correlated with individual xed eects.8 The
7E.g., Cawley (2004), Baum and Ford (2004), and Han et al. (2009).
8The most plausible instrument in the previous literature is the BMI of a family mem-
ber, which was rst used by Cawley (2004); however, Han et al. (2009) and my own
preliminary estimation nd that sibling or parent's BMI predicts only time-invariant com-
ponents of body mass.
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two approaches could be combined, but doing so requires a valid instrument
for changes in BMIit.
An additional problem in the literature on weight and wages is that most
authors have, at least implicitly, assumed that only current body mass aects
wages.9 This assumption is inconsistent with the broader discrimination lit-
erature in which dynamic models are now common. For example, Lang et al.
(2005) show that hiring decisions in a wage posting model magnify eects of
prejudice or expected productivity dierences, resulting in wage dierences
even if employers are not willing to pay more to hire their preferred group.10
Bjerk (2008) shows that any one of a few types of statistical discrimination
can result in wage dierentials over time due to eects on hiring and promo-
tions.11 Adapting either of these models to discrimination based on weight
would imply that a worker's history of body mass could aect her current
wages through eects on past job search and promotions. Furthermore, any
statistical discrimination story in which body mass is used as a signal of
productivity or healthcare costs would imply eects of at least the history of
body mass observed by the current employer.
Regardless of how or why wage penalties arise, the idea that the full eects
More importantly, Cawley et al. (2011) criticize the use of instruments based on genetics,
arguing that even a single gene may be associated with too many outcomes to satisfy an
exclusion restriction. Supporting this argument, I nd that siblings' BMI is correlated
with AFQT scores in the NLSY79, even after controlling for respondents' BMI.
9As mentioned above, Chen (2012) is a recent, important exception.
10Dierences in healthcare costs should have similar eects to productivity dierences
in Lang et al. (2005), which would t the results of Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009).
11Additionally, Oettinger (1996) shows that dierences in uncertainty about workers'
productivity can aect workers' returns to mobility.
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of changes in body mass would be captured by immediate changes in the wage
is not consistent with the presence of labor-market frictions. Employers that
have diculty lowering wages during economic downturns may also have
diculty cutting wages in response to undesirable weight gains. Workers who
face limited opportunities due to their weight may face diculty moving to
better jobs after losing weight, much as workers who enter the labor market
during recessions face lower wages long after the economy recovers.12
If a history of being overweight or obese can aect current wages, regres-
sions like equation (1) should be modied to allow eects of both current
and past body mass. But body mass (past or current) may be aected by
past wages, which are likely correlated with current wages. In addition to the
potential simultaneity of wages and body mass that has been discussed in
the literature, it is possible that BMI is predetermined by past wages. There-
fore, lagged wages should be added to avoid omitted variable bias. Including
lagged wages has the additional benet of allowing lags of body mass that
are not included in the regression to have indirect eects on current wages
through their eects on past wages.
Using a single lag of both wage and body mass results in an autoregressive
wage equation:
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 + i + "it: (2)
12See Kahn (2010) and Oreopoulos et al. (2012). Plant closings and layos have also
been found to have persistent negative eects on wages. See, e.g., Jacobson et al. (1993).
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Both BMIit and BMIit 1 are potentially correlated with the individual xed
eect, i, as is wit 1.13 As before, BMIit might be correlated with the time-
varying error, "it; or with earlier shocks to the wage.
Dynamic panel data models like equation (2) can be estimated using
the dierenced GMM estimator developed in Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and
Arellano and Bond (1991) (HENR and AB in what follows).14 The rst step
in this approach is to dierence equation (2) to eliminate the xed eect:
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 +"it: (3)
After dierencing, BMIit and BMIit 1 may still be correlated with the
error term, and wit 1 is correlated with "it through "it 1.
Fortunately, further lagged levels of the wage are valid instruments for
wit 1 if there is no serial correlation in ". Under this assumption, wit 2
is not correlated with "it or "it 1, but is correlated with wit 1.15 The
GMM estimator of HENR and AB also uses further lags, where available, as
instruments to improve eciency.
It is important to note that assuming no serial correlation in the time-
varying errors, "it, is not equivalent to assuming no serial correlation in wages
or wage growth. On the contrary, the autoregressive specications of equa-
13Further lags of BMI or w can be included, but one lag is sucient to explain the
model. The lag structure is discussed further in Section 3.
14See Arellano and Honore (2001), Bond (2002), or Arellano (2003) for helpful discus-
sions.
15The correlation of wit 2 and wit 1 is weak if  is close to 1; however, the results
presented below suggest this is not a problem.
8
tions (2) and (3) assume that current wages are correlated with past wages,
and current wage growth is correlated with past wage growth. The assump-
tion of no serial correlation in " is violated only if there is serial correlation in
residual heterogeneity that is uncorrelated with lagged wages, BMI (lagged
and current), and any other regressors included in Xit.
16
Lagged levels of BMI are valid instruments in the dierenced estimator
under an additional assumption. Specically, BMIit 2 and further lags are
valid instruments for BMIit and BMIit 1 as long as BMIit is uncorre-
lated with "it+1 for all t. On an intuitive level, if the endogeneity of BMIit
is due to reverse causality, this assumption requires that random shocks to
future wages do not aect current body mass. If there are unobserved shocks
that are common to BMIit and "it, this assumption requires that those shocks
only aect wit+1 through their eects on BMIit and wit.
17
Finally, the identication of equation (3) requires changes in BMI to be
predicted by its lagged levels. BMIit 2 should be correlated with BMIit
if BMIit is endogenous.
18 This assumption nds empirical support in the
dynamic models of body mass estimated by Goldman et al. (2010) and Ng et
16In contrast, serial correlation in the residuals of static wage regressions, which dom-
inate the previous literature, is expected because those residuals are not independent of
lagged wages. The dynamic estimation in the current paper, therefore, supports the com-
ments in Cawley (2004) about serial correlation in the previous literature.
17Shocks to BMIit that are correlated with both "it and "it+1 would imply serial cor-
relation in ", which is testable. However, it's possible that some shocks to BMIit are
uncorrelated with "it but correlated with "it+1, but this is also testable in may cases.
Section 3.1 discusses tests of identifying assumptions in light of such possibilities. Section
4 present results of these tests, as well as an additional falsication test.
18If BMIit were merely predetermined, meaning it was correlated with "it 1 but not
"it, BMIit 1 would also be a valid instrument for BMIit:
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al. (2010). Studies in the epidemiology literature also nd that large changes
in weight are more common among those who were initially heavier.19 Lee et
al. (2010) suggest that avoiding weight gain may require greater eort from
overweight women than from normal weight peers. Finally, in supplemental
regressions (available upon request) I nd that BMIit 2 is correlated with
BMIit, with F statistics above traditional cutos for weak instruments.
20
2 Data
This paper uses data from the 1997 through 2009 waves of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). Individuals in the sample
were between 12 and 16 years of age in 1996. They were between 24 and
30 when interviewed in 2009. The data also contain detailed information on
labor market history, demographics, and other common control variables.
The NLSY97 has important advantages over the 1979 cohort for the pur-
poses of this paper. The '97 respondents were young enough at their rst
interview that nearly all of them are observed as they begin their careers.
They were also asked about height and weight in every year of the survey.
In contrast, NLSY79 respondents were as old as 22 when rst interviewed;
and they were not asked about weight in '79, '80, 83, '84 or '87. As a re-
sult, NLSY79 respondents were between 25 and 33 years old in the rst year
19E.g., see Lewis et al. (2000) and Williamson et al. (1990).
20These regressions are not equivalent to the rst stage of 2SLS. They are suggestive. I
still consider the possibility that the instruments are too weak to identify coecients on
both BMIit and BMIit 1 when I examine the robustness of my results.
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(1990) that BMI could be observed for three years in a row.
In what follows, attention is limited to white men and women due to
concern for sample sizes. Over twice as many respondents identify as white
than as black, which is the second largest racial or ethnic group. Furthermore,
requiring at least three consecutive years of valid wage observations reduces
the number of observations more for minorities and women than for white
men.
Additionally, only jobs following full-time labor market entry are included
in the estimation sample. Entry is dened as the rst two consecutive years
in which the individual works full time and is employed for at least 75% of
the year. This restriction is intended to exclude the temporary or part-time
jobs of younger workers that likely bear little resemblance to their eventual
adult careers.21 Part-time jobs that take place later in workers' careers are
still included in the sample.
The sample also excludes respondents who were in the military, as well
as observations for women who were pregnant at any point since the last
interview. Limiting attention to observations that can be use as time t, t 1,
or t   2 in equation (3) leaves 9,037 observations for 1,473 white men and
5,408 observations for 1,060 white women.
21Nearly 75% of jobs excluded by the entry restriction are part-time, compared to 9%
of jobs in the sample. Median tenure is 23 weeks for excluded jobs, but 85 weeks for jobs
following full-time entry.
The sample includes people who entered the labor-market but returned to (or never
left) school. The results discussed below are robust to excluding people who are in school,
but some statistical signicance is lost due to the smaller sample size.
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A more detailed discussion of the sample's selection is left to an appendix.
The rest of this section discusses information on body mass in the data,
followed by a brief description of the estimation sample.
2.1 Body Mass and Measurement Error
The data include self-reported height and weight in each year, which allows
the construction of BMI.22 The measurement error introduced by the use
of self-reported height and weight is well known and widely discussed; how-
ever, previous research has ignored the fact that roughly 10% of person/year
observations in either NLSY cohort come from telephone interviews, which
worsen misreporting relative to in-person interviews.23 All regressions that
include current or lagged BMI variables also include corresponding dummy
variables for the interview being conducted by phone.
I do not adjust self-reported height and weight based on the relationships
between reported and actual measures in NHANES data, as Cawley (2004)
and others do, for a few reasons. First of all, the assumptions required to
treat NHANES samples as validation data for NLSY cohorts are not credible
given the mix of interview methods in the NLSY.24 Secondly, wage penal-
22BMI is dened as (weight in kg)=(height in m)2
23White women are especially sensitive to interview method. Controlling for age and
individual xed eects, average reported weight falls by over 3.5 pounds when white women
are interviewed by phone. Reported weight falls by over seven pounds when overweight
women are interviewed by phone.
24The critical assumption is that the distribution of actual measures conditional on
reported is the same in both samples. Dierences between interview modes suggest this
assumption is violated even within NLSY cohorts. Furthermore, Han et al. (2009) note
that NHANES respondents expect to be weighed, but NLSY respondents do not.
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ties are more likely driven by whether the worker's appearance conforms to
some desired standard than by an actual BMI number, which is likely not
observed by employers.25 Finally, rescaling BMI to adjust for systematic mis-
reporting may change the BMI numbers at which we observe wage penalties,
but it should not aect our ability to determine whether heavier workers are
penalized at some point.
2.2 The Estimation Sample
Table 1 presents basic summary statistics for the white men and women in
the sample. The appendix tables present additional summary statistics. The
dependent variable in regressions that follow is the natural log of hourly wage.
Average log wage is around 2.3 for men and 2.2 for women, which translates
to hourly wages of roughly 10 and 8.8, respectively.
The average respondent in the sample is roughly 24 years old.26 In 2009,
the average respondent (male or female) was 27 years old. Average years
in the labor market is 4.5 for white men and four for women. White men
have accumulated an average of 4.2 years of actual experience, while white
women have accumulated 3.8 years of experience. In 2009, the average male
respondent had been in the labor market for seven years, accumulating 6.4
25A related point is made by Johansson et al. (2009) who consider eects of actual BMI,
waist circumference and body fat on labor market outcomes in Finland.
26Respondents were as young as 16 in period t   2, or 18 in t. This introduces the
possibility that changes in BMI mostly reect changes in height for part of my sample
and changes in weight for the rest; however, the results presented below are robust to
excluding respondents under the age of 20.
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years of actual work experience. The average woman had been in the labor
market for 6.2 years, accumulating 5.6 years of experience.
Average reported BMI for both genders exceeds 25, which is the threshold
for being overweight. Less than 2% of white men and 4.2% of white women
are underweight (BMI  18:5). Over 57% of white men and nearly 42% of
white women are overweight (BMI  25). 22% of white men and 20% of
white women are obese (BMI  30). Almost 8% of men and over 10% of
women qualify as severely obese (BMI  35).
As seen in the appendix tables, roughly 9% of the men in my sample and
8% of the women move from one of the ocial BMI categories to another
between two consecutive years. For either gender, moving to a heavier BMI
category is more likely than moving to a lighter category. Additionally, the
changes in BMI associated with changes in BMI categories (not shown) tend
to be relatively large.27 Therefore, it does not appear as though identication
is coming from small uctuations in weight that employers would not notice.
3 Estimation
Recall that the dierenced equation we're interested in takes the form
wit = wit 1 +Xit +BMIit+BMIit 11 +"it: (3)
27The median percent change in BMI associated with a change in BMI category is 8.5
percent for men, and 9.5 percent for women. Median changes in BMI are three to four
times larger when categories change than they are otherwise.
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As mentioned in the rst section, the GMM approach developed by HENR
and AB uses second and further lagged levels as instruments for wit 1 and
other endogenous variables. The GMM instruments enter as separate vectors
for each year.28 If a lag is missing, it enters as a zero. This allows the use of
further lags without limiting observations to cases that have those lags.
Letting Z denote the matrix of all instruments and b the vector of es-
timated residuals, the moment conditions are E [Z 0b] = 0. These moment
conditions are estimated in Stata using XTABOND2.29 All estimates use
two-step ecient GMM, which produces robust standard errors, and apply
the Windmeijer (2005) nite-sample variance correction.
3.1 Testing Assumptions
In Section 1, I assumed that the time-varying errors, "it, are not serially
correlated. AB developed tests for this assumption. First-dierenced regres-
sions like equation (3) are AR(1) by design. If there is serial correlation in
", equation (3) will be at least AR(2). I present tests for serial correlation
with all of the results that follow.
The results are also presented with tests for overidentifying restrictions.
The Hansen J test examines the joint validity of all moment conditions.
When BMI is treated as endogenous, dierence-in-Hansen tests are used to
28At t = 3, wi1 is an instrument for wi2. At t = 4, wi2 and wi1 are instruments for
wi3, and so on.
29See Roodman (2006) for documentation. Stata contains other dynamic panel-data
programs, but they do not provide the same array of tests as XTABOND2.
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evaluate the validity of wage lags and BMI lags separately.
The validity of lagged wage levels as instruments is independently evalu-
ated by each of these tests. Lagged wage levels are valid instruments if "it are
not serially correlated. If we fail to detect serial correlation that does exist,
tests of overidentifying restrictions could still reject the validity of lagged
wage instruments as long as further lags are valid instruments.30
The validity of lagged BMI instruments are only evaluated directly by
the overidentication tests; however, testing for serial correlation makes the
assumptions of the overidentication tests more plausible. Tests of overi-
dentifying restrictions require at least one of the BMI lags to be a valid
instrument for BMIit 1: If BMIit were correlated with "it+1 but not "it+2,
the second lags would not be valid instruments but the third lags would be.
Overidentication based on lagged BMI variables would be untestable only
if BMIit was correlated with "it+1, "it+2, "it+3, etc.; however, the absence
of serial correlation in " would make this less likely. For example, BMIit
could be correlated with "it+1 and later residuals due to health shocks that
aect body mass more immediately than they aect wages. But such health
shocks would imply serial correlation in ", unless the unobserved shocks that
were common to BMIit and "it+1 were somehow independent of the shocks
common to BMIit and "it+2: Although this strikes me as unlikely, I con-
30The Arellano-Bond tests would have to miss a lot of serial correlation for lagged wage
instruments to be untestable using overidentication. If equation (3) were AR(2) but not
AR(3), wit 2 would not be a valid instrument for wit 1, but wit 3 would be. If the
regression were AR(3) but not AR(4), wit 4 would be a valid instrument, etc.
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sider the possible eects of health shocks on identication when I discuss the
robustness of results in Section 4.2.31
3.2 Other Potential Problems with Instruments
The use of all lagged levels of wage and BMI variables quickly produces a
large number of instruments. A larger set of instruments improves eciency,
but not without a cost. As discussed by Roodman (2009) and others, us-
ing \too many" instruments overts the endogenous variables, which biases
coecients towards OLS and weakens overidentication tests.32
The results presented in the next section restrict lags to the second
through fth. Using all available lags produces coecients that are smaller
in magnitude, which is consistent with adding weak instruments. Restrict-
ing lags further (e.g., excluding the fth lag) has little eect on coecient
estimates.
3.3 Regression Specications
All specications presented in this paper model BMIit as a vector of dummy
variables for various levels of body mass. The use of dummy variables is
motivated by the need for a simple specication that allows a non-linear rela-
31My goal here and elsewhere is to convince readers that my identifying assumptions are
reasonable and weaker than they may seem at rst glance. That said, I acknowledge that
the identication of causal eects in this paper, as in any other, still relies on assumptions.
32Roodman (2009) recommends that researchers consider the sensitivity of estimates
to reductions in the number of instruments. He also urges caution when interpreting J
statistics, suggesting p-values below 0.25 are cause for concern.
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tionship between BMI and wages.33 Dummy variables are consistent with the
idea that wage penalties are associated with weight exceeding levels that are
considered desirable in the market, which is supported by the semiparametric
estimation of Gregory and Ruhm (2011). However, there is no theoretical
reason to adopt one specication of BMIit over any other.
When estimating regressions with dummy variables for BMI categories,
the previous literature relied on categories dened by the WHO (overweight,
obese, etc.); however, these categories were dened for the study of public
health, not labor markets. As noted by Gregory and Ruhm (2011), wage
penalties for high body mass may begin at points that fall between WHO
cutos. Even if employers wanted to penalize workers based on the WHO
categories, it's not clear how rms' imperfect assessments of body mass would
line up with the imperfectly reported height and weight in the data.
The next section begins with specications that use traditional BMI cat-
egories, but then discusses the use of dummy variables for exceeding alter-
native BMI thresholds. These alternative thresholds range from 23 to 38, in
intervals of half a BMI point. I focus on specications of BMIit that include
one or two dummy variables.34
I narrow this large set of alternatives specications based rst on the
33In preliminary estimation, linear and polynomial specications of BMIit only pro-
duced statistically signicant results in static OLS regressions. Ignoring statistical signif-
icance, the results based on cubic polynomials are roughly consistent with the preferred
dummy-variable specications.
34I estimated models with three dummy variables, but they provided no obvious advan-
tage over those with two.
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robustness of coecient estimates for a BMI dummy variable to other changes
in the specication of BMIit. Essentially, I estimate all of the alternative
models and allow them to \vote" on which BMI thresholds matter. I then
compare these relatively robust specications to similar specications using
the tests proposed by Bond et al. (2001) and Andrews and Lu (2001), which
are both based on comparisons of the Hansen J statistic.35 Finally, I consider
the robustness of my preferred specications to the treatment of outliers in
the distribution of wages.36
All of the dynamic models presented below include only one lag of wage
and one lag of BMI. None of the tests for serial correlation suggest that
more lags of the wage are needed, and the tests of overidentication fail to
suggest a problem with the instruments. Further lags of BMI are never
statistically signicant and do not qualitatively change the results for the
rst lag of BMI. The main eect of adding a second lag of either BMI or
the wage is reducing observations by 20% for men and 25% for women.37
All regressions control for the local unemployment rate and incidence of
obesity in the state, as well as dummy variables for region, urban residence,
and being interviewed by telephone.38 When lagged values of BMI variables
35I used leave-one-out crossvalidation, dropping all observations for each respondent one
at a time, to ensure that these test results were not peculiar to the estimation sample.
36As noted in the appendix, I only drop wages if  ln(wit) is greater than 6.5 in absolute
value. This leaves some observations with unusually high or low wages.
37An advantage of focusing on young workers is that they have less history in the market
to control for. In a sample of older workers, one lag of wages or BMI would be expected
to capture less of a worker's relevant past.
38Local unemployment and state identiers are provided by the NLSY97 Geocode les.
Percent obese in the state is tracked by the CDC.
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are included as regressors, the corresponding lag of the phone dummy is
also included. Education enters as dummy variables for completing high
school, some college, or college and beyond. I control for time using dummy
variables for calendar year and the number of years since labor market entry.
No estimation in this paper is weighted.
I also control for actual experience in the labor market and it's square
in the dynamic panel estimates. To control for commitment to the labor
market, I add interactions of experience with years since entry. Controlling
for actual experience and its interactions makes the validity of lagged wages
as instruments more likely.39 Since actual experience might be endogenous,
potential experience (age schooling six), its square and its interactions are
used as traditional instruments in the dynamic models. In OLS regressions,
I simply replace actual experience with potential.
Finally, there are a number of potential confounders, such as occupa-
tion or hours worked, that are excluded from the preferred models due to
their likely endogeneity. After presenting the main results, I examine the
robustness of those results to the addition of these variables. I also discuss
the possibility that some of these variables may be intermediate outcomes
through which body mass aects wages.
39Lagged wages might reect the accumulation of experience or commitment to the
labor market. Overidentication tests for lagged wage instruments improve with the use
of actual experience and its interactions.
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4 Results
I nd that white men face a penalty for past severe obesity. White women
face a penalty for past BMI over 24.5, with additional penalties for past BMI
of 37 or more. The only evidence of an eect of current BMI on wages is a
penalty faced by women with a reported BMI of at least 37. Additionally,
the results support the use of autoregressive wage equations and suggest that
BMI is endogenous even after removing individual xed eects.
The next subsection discusses the main results, and then compares the
preferred dynamic models to simpler regressions. Section 4.2 considers the
robustness of the main results to several potential sources of bias.
4.1 The Preferred Models
As discussed in section 3.3, BMIit is modeled using dummy variables for ex-
ceeding various BMI thresholds. In what follows, I rst present specications
based on the familiar categories of overweight, obese and severely obese. I
then consider alternative specications of BMIit. Preferred specications
are selected based on robustness of the estimated coecients to changes in
specication and the treatment of outliers, as well as formal specication
tests.
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4.1.1 Results for White Men
Table 2 presents results for white men from various models that use dummy
variables indicating overweight, obesity or severe obesity.40 First of all, note
that the tests presented in the lower panel are all consistent with the iden-
tifying assumptions discussed above. All of the equations are AR(1) due to
rst-dierencing; but none of them are AR(2), which they would be if there
were serial correlation in the residuals. Furthermore, none of the tests of
overidentifying restrictions reject the validity of the GMM instruments. All
of the p-values for Hansen and dierence-in-Hansen tests are well above the
conservative threshold of 0.25 suggested by Roodman (2009).
The coecient estimates in Table 2 suggest that white men face a penalty
of roughly 17% for having been severely obese in the previous year. The
coecients on lagged severe obesity range from -0.165 (0.060) in column 4
to -0.172 (0.059) in column 5. No other BMI variable has a statistically
signicant coecient in this table, and there is no evidence of current BMI
having any eect on the wages of white men.41
The results for men also support the inclusion of an autoregressive term in
the wage equations. In specications that include severe obesity, coecients
on lagged log wages are between 0.072 (0.041) and 0.077 (0.042). Further-
40All specications in Tables 2 and 3 use lagged indicators of overweight, obesity and
severe obesity as instruments. This ensures that the instruments capture the same amount
of variation in each specication. I also use lags of three BMI dummies as instruments
when alternative BMI cutos are considered, with each alternative category replacing the
closest WHO category.
41Results for the model that specied BMIit using overweight and obese are excluded.
They are consistent with those in columns 2 and 3.
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more, controlling for lagged wages is essential for identication. Specica-
tions that exclude lagged wages but are otherwise similar to those in Table 2
(not shown) are at least AR(2). Consistent with Cawley's (2004) point that
lagged BMI variables are not likely to be valid instruments in the presence of
serial correlation, the second lags of BMI are rejected by overidentication
tests in these specications.42
When I consider alternative dummy variable specications for BMIit,
I nd that the penalty for lagged severe obesity is the most robust result
for men across specications.43 There is no robust evidence of an eect at
lower levels of current or lagged body mass for white men.44 Finally, the test
proposed by Andrews and Lu (2001) supports models that use severe obesity
over similar models that use nearby cutos.45
I select a preferred specication from Table 2 using the test of parameter
restrictions proposed by Bond et al. (2001).46 The only restricted specica-
42It is reassuring to see that overidentication tests reject the validity of instruments in
cases where we do not expect the exclusion restrictions to hold.
43The coecient on lagged severe obesity is qualitatively similar and statistically sig-
nicant in specications with lower cutos ranging from 24 to 33. Coecients on lagged
BMI34.5 are similar, but smaller and statistically signicant in fewer models.
44Coecients on BMI  29.5 are statistically signicant in a few specications, but are
not robust to the treatment of outliers. They are driven by a single observation in which
the reported wage fell from $7.11 to $0.04.
45Andrews and Lu (2001) develop a GMM analogue of the Bayesian Information Crite-
rion. When comparing models that have the same number of variables and instruments,
their approach amounts to selecting the model that minimizes the Hansen J statistic. For
example, the J statistics of models that replace severe obesity in column 5 of Table 2 with
indicators for BMI 34:5 or 35:5 rise to 135.5 and 139.3, respectively.
46Bond et al. (2001) show that dierences between the J statistics of restricted and
unrestricted specications are distributed 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number
of restrictions.
23
tion that cannot be rejected in favor of the full specication (column 1) is the
specication in column 5, which models BMIit using dummy variables for
being overweight and severely obese.47 The Andrews-Lu test also selects this
specication over the others that use two dummy variables to model BMIit.
Since the specication in column 5 is simpler than that in column 1, it is my
preferred specication in what follows.
4.1.2 Results for White Women
Table 3 presents results for white women using dummy variables for tradi-
tional BMI categories. The only statistically signicant results for a BMI
variable in these specications suggests a penalty for a lagged BMI in (or
above) the overweight category. The coecient on lagged overweight status
is -0.082 (0.040) in column 2, and -0.093 (0.044) in column 6.
Using alternative BMI dummy variables is more important for white
women than for white men. My preferred specication for white women
uses indicators for a reported BMI greater than or equal to 24.5 and 37. The
penalty for a lagged BMI24.5 is robust across all specications with a sec-
ond cuto at or above 27, or without a second BMI variable. As seen in Table
4, the estimated coecients on lagged overweight status (columns 5-8) are
similar, but consistently smaller than analogous coecients on lagged BMI
 24.5 (columns 1-4).48 Among dummy variables for higher BMI thresholds,
47Columns 2 and 3 are rejected at any conventional level. Column 6 is rejected at a 5%
level, and column 4 at a 10% level.
48Coecients on lagged overweight status are statistically signicant roughly half as
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those indicating a current or lagged BMI  37 were the most robust across
specications.49 The results for this specication are also robust to changes
in the treatment of outliers.
Comparing the J statistics in Table 4, the specication in column 7, which
uses overweight status, narrowly outperforms the one in column 3. However,
the direction of this dierence is not robust to the treatment of outliers or
to small changes in the set of instruments used.50 To cast more light on
this matter, I use the test proposed by Bond et al. (2001) to compare these
specications to a specication that nests both. Regardless of the set of
instruments used, the specication that uses indicators for BMI  25 and
BMI  37 is easily rejected against the nested model, but the specication
with indicators for 24.5 and 37 is not.51 Therefore, I model BMIit using
dummy variables for BMI  24.5 and  37 in what follows; however, using
overweight status instead of BMI  24.5 has little qualitative eect on the
results.
The estimates from the preferred specication, presented in column (3)
of Table 4, suggest that white women face a 10% penalty for a lagged BMI
of 24.5 or more. Women are penalized an additional 10% for a lagged BMI
often as those on lagged BMI  24.5.
49Coecients for BMI cutos near 37 were similar to those for BMI  37, but were
smaller in magnitude and statistically signicant in fewer alternative models.
50E.g., the specication in column 3 minimizes the J statistic if dummy variables for
lags of obesity are not included in the set of instruments, or if lagged overweight status is
used as an instrument in both specications. In contrast, such changes have no eect on
the relative performance of specications for men.
51These tests hold GMM instruments constant across specications. I repeat the tests
with and without dummy variables for past obesity included in the set of instruments.
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of 37 or more. Furthermore, white women face a 13% penalty for a current
BMI of 37 or more.
It is worth noting that the upper BMI cutos for white men and women
are more similar than they appear. The percentage of women in the sample
who exceed a BMI of 37 (7.9%) is similar to the percentage of men who are
severely obese (7.8%). Therefore, the results for both white men and women
suggest that workers are penalized for past body mass in the heaviest 8% of
the relevant subsample.
The results also suggest that lagged wages have larger eects on current
wages for white women than for white men. The coecients on lagged log
wages are 0.220 (0.053) for women and 0.077 (0.042) for men.52 As in Table
2, there is no evidence of serial correlation in the residuals of any model
shown in Table 3 or 4; however, regressions that exclude lagged wages are
at least AR(2). Furthermore, neither Hansen nor dierence-in-Hansen tests
cast doubt on the validity of instruments in the autoregressive models of
Tables 2 through 4.
On a more meaningful level, autoregressive wage equations imply that
workers' history of body mass aects wages beyond the single lags included
in the model. The wage in t 1 is a function of BMIit 2. It's also a function
of wit 2, which is aected by BMIit 3; and so on. This is an important
advantage of dynamic models: In contrast to previous work, the models in
52Note that the weak identication problem discussed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is
not relevant when none of the coecients on lagged wages approach one.
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this paper do not assume that the penalty for being heavy is the same as
the penalty for becoming heavy. Wages respond slowly to changes in BMI,
implying in penalties that persist and accumulate over time.
As an example, consider two women who enter the market at t  2: One
has a BMI of 38 and the other has a BMI of 23. The heavier woman loses
weight and the other gains weight so that both are overweight (but not obese)
in years t  1 and t. In t  1; the woman who had been heavier faces a 20%
penalty according to Table 4, while the woman who had been lighter faces
no statistically signicant penalty for her recent weight gain. In year t, both
women have been overweight (but not obese) for two years; however, one
faces a penalty of 10% and the other faces a penalty of nearly 15%.53
The negative eects of high body mass also accumulate over time. A
woman who enters the market with a BMI over 37 initially faces a penalty of
roughly 13%. If she does not lose weight, she will again face the 13% penalty
for current body mass in her second year, plus a 20% penalty for her past
body mass. In her third year with a BMI over 37, she will be penalized an
additional 4.5% for her BMI two years ago, on top of the 33% penalty for
her BMI in t and t  1.
53The estimated eect of BMIit 2  37 in t is -0.044 (0.020), the eect in t 1 multiplied
by the coecient on wit 1. If the woman was also overweight in t   1, her combined
penalty in t is -0.148 (0.056).
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4.1.3 Comparisons to Simpler Models
Tables 5A and 5B compare the preferred dynamic specications to OLS re-
gressions and an autoregressive model that assumes BMIit is exogenous.
The OLS results for men in Table 5A suggest that overweight men are paid
more than lighter peers while severely obese men are paid less.54 The OLS
results in Table 5B suggest that a BMI24.5 is associated with lower wages
for white women, which is consistent with previous research; however, this
negative association appears to be driven by lagged BMI, not current.
The autoregressions presented in the second column of Tables 5A and
5B remove any bias that may arise from correlation with individual xed
eects or the omission of lagged wages, but assume BMIit and BMIit 1
are exogenous. Tests of overidentifying restrictions (not shown) reject this
assumption, suggesting that changes in BMI are correlated with time-varying
unobservables.55 The fact that the negative eects of body mass found in the
preferred specications are not found in the second column of either table is
consistent with time-varying unobservables, such as time spent sitting at a
desk, that are positively correlated with both wages and body mass.
Finally, note that the error terms in the OLS regressions shown in Tables
5A and 5B are serially correlated, while the errors in the dynamic models are
54When lagged BMI variables are added, the OLS coecients on current and lagged
dummies for BMI categories are jointly signicant for white men.
55I can reject the exogeneity of the BMIit for white men when I use only the second and
third lags of w as instruments. (Recall that using more instruments weakens overidenti-
cation tests.) I can reject the exogeneity of BMIit and BMIit 1 for women in models
that include further lagged levels of BMI as instruments.
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not. Serial correlation in the static OLS regressions supports the argument
in Cawley (2004) against the use of lagged BMI variables as instruments in
static wage equations. The fact that evidence of serial correlation disap-
pears when lagged wages are incorporated into the model supports the use of
dynamic models and the identifying assumptions they require. Essentially,
the dynamic wage equations explicitly model the correlation between past
and current wages creates serial correlation in the residuals of static wage
regressions.
4.2 Robustness Tests and Potential Sources of Bias
4.2.1 Adding Potentially Endogenous Variables
There are a number of variables that might be correlated with both wages
and BMI that have been excluded so far due to potential endogeneity. Some
of these variables are potential intermediate outcomes through which body
mass could inuence wages. Examining the robustness of the results to the
inclusion of such variables may shed light on potential mechanisms connecting
BMI to wages. If controlling for a new variable does not aect the estimated
coecients for BMI, it probably isn't an important intermediate outcome.
The results presented above are surprisingly robust to the addition of
potentially endogenous confounders.56 The rst such variables I consider are
marital status, number of children, and indicators for age of the youngest
56All of the results discussed in this subsection are available on request; however, I do
not present most of these results for the sake of brevity.
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child being less than or equal to two or ve. There are a number of reasons
these variables may be correlated with wages and BMI, especially for women;
however, their addition to my preferred models has no noticeable aect on
the estimated coecients.57
One might expect a high BMI to be related to hours worked, the dura-
tion of employment relationships or investment in on-the-job training; how-
ever, I nd no evidence that these are important confounders or intermediate
outcomes. I examined hours worked by adding current and lagged dummy
variables for working part time or working 60 hours or more per week. I also
added current and lagged levels of tenure, as well as indicators for the receipt
of on-the-job training.58 In each case, the estimated coecients of interest
were similar to those presented above.
I also nd no evidence of BMI aecting wages through selection into
jobs that oer health insurance. Working for an employer that oers health
insurance is associated with higher wages. A wage dierential could arise
in part from heavier workers being pushed out of jobs that oer insurance;
however, adding indicators for employer-provided insurance has little eect
on the results.59
57For discussions of BMI and marriage, see Averett et al. (2008) or Chiappori et al.
(2012). The presence and age of children would more likley be an endogenous confounder
than an intermediate outcome.
58I considered specications of training as both a dummy variable for training in the
past year, and a count of years in which training was received.
59This result does not directly contradict Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2009), who suggest
that wage penalties vary with whether health insurance is oered or not. Unfortunately,
extending my estimation to investigate their story is not practical.
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Health Shocks & Identication
The identifying assumptions in this paper have already received an unusual
amount of empirical scrutiny in Section 4.1; however, further examination of
these assumptions is justied for two reasons. First, as is always the case, it
is possible that a test presented in Section 4.1 failed to reject an assumption
that should have been rejected.60 Secondly, as discussed in Section 3.1, the
validity of using lagged levels of BMI as instruments would be untestable if
(and only if) BMIit were somehow correlated with all future wage residuals
("it+1; "it+2; etc.) without those residuals being correlated with each other.
The most obvious reason why BMIit might be correlated with future wage
residuals is that random health shocks could aect body mass immediately,
but have delayed eects on wages that are independent of BMIit. Although
it seems likely that health shocks that cause BMIit; to be correlated with
both "it+1 and "it+2 would also cause "it+1 and "it+2 to be correlated with
each other, I empirically examine the possibility that my main results are
biased by such shocks in Table 6.
Table 6 compares the preferred models from Section 4.1 to models that
add indicators of current and lagged general health. The self-reported mea-
sure of health that is available in the data is obviously not ideal; however, it
is at least correlated with body mass as one would expect it to be.61 If the
60Tests of serial correlation and overidentifying restrictions did reject the hypotheses in
Section 4.1 that were expected to be rejected, but type II errors are still possible.
61Respondents were asked to evaluate their health on a ve-point scale from \excellent"
(1) to \poor" (5). Higher levels of BMI are negatively correlated with \excellent" or \very
good" health, and positively correlated with \fair" or \poor" health.
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main results are biased by health shocks that are correlated with changes in
reported health, results from the preferred specications should not be ro-
bust to the inclusion of rst-dierenced health variables. The results would
also not be robust to the addition of health variables if health were an in-
termediate outcome through which body mass aected wages. Therefore,
the falsication test in Table 6 could suggest a problem with my identifying
assumptions even when none exists.
The preferred models for men and women are quite robust to the inclusion
of changes in general health status. Regardless of whether I add only the
current changes or current and lagged changes in health, the coecients on
BMI change very little.62 Furthermore, the overidentication tests at the
bottom of the table do not suggest that the health variables have any impact
on the identication of the BMI variables, or the overall identication of the
model.
Occupation
As shown in Table 7, indicators for occupation are the only variables I've
found that do aect the results of my preferred models. The estimated eects
of BMI on the wages of women fall when controls for occupation are added.
62I also estimated models with up to ve lags of the health indicators, as well as models
that use the lagged residuals of BMI regressed on indicators for changes in health. In
each case, the results were similar to those in Table 6.
The results for BMI are not sensitive to assumptions about the exogeneity of general
health, but the coecients for the health indicators (not shown) are. When health is
treated as exogenous, reporting \very good" health is associated with higher wages than
\excellent" health; but that eect disappears when health is treated as endogenous.
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Only the coecient for a lagged BMI24.5 is still statistically signicant at
even a 10% level, and it falls from -0.103 (0.043) to -0.078 (0.046). On the
other hand, the eect of past severe obesity on the wages of white men rises,
if anything.
The regressions presented in Table 7 use second lagged levels of occu-
pation as instruments because the exogeneity of current occupation can be
rejected for both genders. Although the second lags cannot be jointly rejected
for either gender, the second lag of managerial, professional and technical oc-
cupations can be rejected for women. Especially when combined with the
changes in coecients on BMI variables, these results are consistent with
those in Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), which suggest that body mass
drives selection into occupations for women.63
4.2.2 Sample Selection
There are two reasons to worry about selection into the estimation sample
biasing results in this paper: The dynamic models require three consecutive
years of labor market participation, and I've limited attention to workers who
have worked full time for at least 75% of two consecutive years. On the other
hand, the dierenced estimator is only aected by selection bias if selection
into the sample is based on time-varying unobservables. Bias from selection
on unobservables that are constant over time is removed by dierencing.
I apply the test of sample selection bias developed by Semykina and
63Also see Han et al. (2011), as well as the recent structural work of Harris (2014). Like
Lakdawalla and Philipson (2007), these papers use data from the 1979 NLSY.
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Wooldridge (2010). I estimate probits for the probability of being in the
sample in year t with valid observations for t, t   1 and t   2:64 I then add
the resulting inverse Mills ratios and their interactions with time dummies
to the wage regressions. The null hypothesis of no selection is rejected if
coecients on the Mills ratios and their interactions are jointly signicant.
The null hypothesis of no selection cannot be rejected for either men
or women. None of the coecients on inverse Mills ratios or their interac-
tions are statistically signicant. The p-value on the test of joint statistical
signicance is 0.26 for white men and 0.29 for white women. These tests,
therefore, do not suggest that the results of this paper are biased by selection
on time-varying unobservables.
4.2.3 Further Examination of the Strength of Instruments
Although preliminary regressions support the assumption that BMIit 2 and
other recent lags predict BMIit, one might still worry that lagged levels are
not capable of identifying coecients on both BMIit and BMIit 1.65 In
that case, the estimates in my preferred specications, especially for BMIit,
would be biased toward zero.66
To examine this possibility, I compare the preferred specications to re-
64AFQT is used as an instrument in the probit estimates. AFQT strongly predicts
participation, but it is dierenced out of the wage equations.
65The GMM estimator of HENR exploits a larger set of moment conditions than tra-
ditional IV estimation. Regressions of BMIit on lagged levels are not analogous to the
rst stage of traditional 2SLS.
66More precisely, the coecients would be biased toward those in the second columns
of Tables 5A and 5B, which are smaller and statistically insignicant.
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stricted specications that include either BMIit or BMIit 1, but not
both. If there is an eect of BMIit that we can't observe in the main
results due to insucient variation in the instruments, we would expect a
change in the coecients on BMIit when BMIit 1 is excluded.67
The results (not shown) do not suggest that the preferred specications
are aected by weak instruments. Dropping BMIit 1 from wage equations
does not reveal eects of current BMI that were not previously identied.
In fact, the estimated penalty white women face for a current BMI37 is
only statistically signicant when lagged BMI is also included in the regres-
sion. Furthermore, comparing Hansen J statistics between specications, as
suggested by Bond et al. (2001), rejects the restricted specications for both
men and women in favor of the preferred models from Tables 2 and 4.
5 Discussion
The results of this paper demonstrate the importance of using dynamic mod-
els when considering eects of body mass on wages. I nd that past body
mass aects the wages of young workers more often than current body mass.
Furthermore, current wages are aected by lagged wages, which are aected
by further lags of body mass and wages. Therefore, in contrast to previous
work, my results make it clear that the penalty for becoming heavy is not the
same as the penalty for being heavy throughout the early years of a career.
67The coecients could also change because BMIit is correlated with BMIit 1:
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Penalties for a high body mass can persist and even accumulate over time,
especially for women.
Consistent with the youth of the sample, the penalties for high body
mass identied in this paper do not appear to be driven by changes in health
or selection into jobs with employer-provided health insurance. The main
results are robust to the addition of controls for general health or having a
job that oers insurance coverage. Furthermore, the dierences in penalties
by gender seem more consistent with discrimination based on appearance
than with impaired health or expected healthcare costs.
The results are consistent with dynamic models of discrimination that
incorporate labor market frictions. For example, models in which discrimi-
nation aects labor market search, like those in Bowlus and Eckstein (2002)
and Lang et al. (2005), are consistent with penalties based on recent lags of
body mass. The idea that body mass can aect labor market search is also
supported by the eld experiment of Rooth (2009), who nds that obese job
applicants receive fewer interview requests.
Finally, persistent eects of high body mass on wages are consistent with
eects on occupational selection. Some of the evidence in this paper points
to occupation as an intermediate outcome through which body mass aects
wages, especially in the case of white women. The results suggest that the
occupational selection observed in the NLSY79 by Lakdawalla and Philipson
(2007) and Harris (2014) still aects the wages of young workers who entered
the labor market in more recent decades.
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A Data
This appendix describes the selection of the estimation sample, and presents
more detailed summary statistics.
The sample was rst restricted to white respondents in the NLSY97. This
drops 3,752 respondents, leaving 2,702 white men and 2,530 white women.
Respondents who reported being in the military were then dropped, leaving
34,522 person/year observations for 2,470 men, and 31,378 observations for
2,481 women.68
Restricting observations to those in which the respondent has entered the
labor market reduces the number of observations to 12,368 for 1,771 white
men, and 10,008 for 1,566 women. Only the primary (current or most recent)
job is used from each interview. Observations in which a woman reported
being pregnant in the current year (since the last interview) or previous year
were also dropped, reducing observations to 8,600 for 1,558 women. Finally,
5 observations for men and 2 for a woman were dropped because the absolute
value of the change in log wages was greater than 6.5.69
The preferred dynamic panel specications require three consecutive ob-
servations in a row with non-missing values of wage and BMI. Restricting
observations to those that could be from one of three such consecutive years
leaves 9,037 observations for 1,473 men and 5,408 observations for 1,060
women.
68This includes 63 observations in which a respondent reported a military occupation
despite not being otherwise identied as in the military.
69These observations were obvious outliers in the distribution of log wage changes. One
of the wage observations in each case was below $0.2. Otherwise, observations that might
appear to be outliers in the distribution of wages were not dropped from the sample.
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The appendix tables A1 and A2 present summary statistics for men and
women that are not presented in Table 1. The mean wage for white men is
pulled up by outliers; however, estimates do not appear sensitive to dropping
these high wage observations. Median hourly wages (not shown) are $9.86
for men and $8.98 for women.
As expected, the sample is largely urban. The dierences in urbanicity
between men and women, as well as most of the dierences in education,
appear to be due to how men and women enter the labor market. Looking
at the entire sample (not shown), instead of focusing on those who are com-
mitted enough to the labor market to be in the estimation sample, reveals no
dierence by gender in urbanicity and much smaller dierences in education.
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Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
White Men
Wage 19.887 356.121 0.039 23,883.93
Log Wage 2.332 0.619 -3.252 10.081
BMI 26.721 5.524 12.838 63.313
Underweight 0.018 0.134 0 1
Overweight 0.573 0.495 0 1
Obese 0.222 0.415 0 1
Severely Obese 0.078 0.269 0 1
Age 23.711 2.693 16 30
Phone Interview 0.108 0.310 0 1
Yrs since LM Entry 4.474 2.658 1 14
    Yrs in 2009 7.012 2.563 3 14
Actual Experience 4.172 2.459 0.75 13.058
     Exp in 2009 6.398 2.413 1.846 13.058
White Women
Wage 11.051 21.528 0.046 774.08
Log Wage 2.196 0.563 -3.069 6.652
BMI 25.810 6.665 10.962 72.620
Underweight 0.042 0.201 0 1
Overweight 0.417 0.493 0 1
Obese 0.202 0.401 0 1
Severely Obese 0.103 0.304 0 1
Age 23.963 2.554 16 30
Phone Interview 0.103 0.304 0 1
Yrs since LM Entry 4.053 2.491 1 13
    Yrs in 2009 6.187 2.510 3 13
Actual Experience 3.793 2.293 0.75 12.769
     Exp in 2009 5.625 2.334 1.558 12.769
The sample for this table includes all observations that are used as t , t- 1, or t -2 in the main estimation. 
There are 9,037 observations for 1,473 white men; and 5,408 observations for 1060 white women.
Table 1.  Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.ln(wage) 0.0722* 0.0605 0.0648 0.0769* 0.0720* 0.0768*
(0.0414) (0.0410) (0.0416) (0.0420) (0.0412) (0.0421)
Overweight -0.1187 -0.0977 -0.1190
(0.1198) (0.1224) (0.1207)
L.Overweight 0.0540 0.0477 0.0549
(0.0491) (0.0456) (0.0470)
Obese 0.0112 0.0054 -0.0051
(0.0979) (0.1021) (0.1012)
L.Obese 0.0030 0.0175 0.0061
(0.0567) (0.0576) (0.0600)
Severely Obese 0.0465 0.0745 0.0557 0.0360
(0.0927) (0.0938) (0.0925) (0.0951)
L.Severely Obese -0.1699*** -0.1649*** -0.1722*** -0.1668**
(0.0632) (0.0598) (0.0594) (0.0680)
AR(1): z -statistic -5.008 -4.968 -4.995 -5.003 -4.998 -4.994
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.542 -0.685 -0.693 -0.595 -0.568 -0.603
   p -value 0.588 0.494 0.489 0.552 0.570 0.546
Hansen J Statistic 128.5 144.4 146.3 136.7 130.3 135.3
Hansen test p -value 0.802 0.546 0.501 0.718 0.803 0.707
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- values)
   ln(wage) lags 0.377 0.367 0.395 0.341 0.347 0.339
   BMI cat. Lags 0.770 0.516 0.533 0.662 0.738 0.678
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men. All 
specifications have a total of 196 instruments, with lags of all three BMI dummies used as instruments in each case. 
Regressions also control for the local unemployment rate and percent obese in the state, as well as dummies for region, urban 
residence, being interviewed over the phone and its lag, completing HS, some college, and college or beyond, calendar year 
and years since labor market entry. To control for commitment to the labor market I include actual experience and its 
interactions with years since entry; however, I treat experience as endogenous, using potential experience and its interactions 
as instruments.
Results for Traditional BMI Categories
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
Table 2. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Men
…
…
…
…
…
…
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.ln(wage) 0.2110*** 0.2308*** 0.2158*** 0.2209*** 0.2237*** 0.2223***
(0.0567) (0.0568) (0.0542) (0.0557) (0.0577) (0.0575)
Overweight 0.0420 0.0760 0.0509 0.0658
(0.1007) (0.0547) (0.0957) (0.0549)
L.Overweight -0.0781 -0.0819** -0.0625 -0.0931**
(0.0519) (0.0402) (0.0466) (0.0436)
Obese 0.0712 0.0937 0.0785
(0.0840) (0.0649) (0.0814)
L.Obese -0.0319 -0.0032 -0.0085
(0.0582) (0.0477) (0.0563)
Severely Obese 0.0166 0.0267 0.0155
(0.0589) (0.0672) (0.0612)
L.Severely Obese -0.0640 -0.0579 -0.0503
(0.0718) (0.0647) (0.0661)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.863 -4.994 -4.937 -4.928 -4.941 -4.907
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.405 -0.162 -0.329 -0.455 -0.261 -0.405
   p -value 0.686 0.871 0.742 0.649 0.794 0.686
Hansen J Statistic 111.8 114.6 115.2 121.2 113.4 112.2
Hansen test p -value 0.936 0.943 0.938 0.872 0.938 0.947
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- value)
   ln(wage) lags 0.704 0.667 0.745 0.559 0.775 0.740
   BMI cat. Lags 0.931 0.939 0.912 0.855 0.928 0.958
…
…
…
Results for Traditional BMI Categories
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 . There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women. All 
specifications have a total of 187 instruments, with lags of all three BMI dummies used as instruments in each case. 
Regressions also control for the local unemployment rate and percent obese in the state, as well as dummies for region, urban 
residence, being interviewed over the phone and its lag, completing HS, some college, and college or beyond, calendar year 
and years since labor market entry. To control for commitment to the labor market I include actual experience and its 
interactions with years since entry; however, I treat experience as endogenous, using potential experience and its interactions 
as instruments.
Table 3. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Women
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L.ln(wage) 0.214*** 0.220*** 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.227*** 0.233*** 0.224*** 0.230***
(0.059) (0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.059) (0.055) (0.053) (0.055)
Lower BMI Var. 0.050 0.066 0.018 0.027 0.081* 0.100* 0.084 0.062
(0.148) (0.096) (0.085) (0.091) (0.048) (0.058) (0.071) (0.077)
L.(Lower BMI Var.) -0.112*** -0.104** -0.104** -0.098** -0.083** -0.082* -0.087** -0.080**
(0.039) (0.046) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039)
BMI ≥ 36.5 -0.102 -0.099
(0.096) (0.086)
L.(BMI ≥ 36.5) -0.048 -0.032
(0.056) (0.056)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.131** -0.138**
(0.056) (0.058)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.099* -0.069
(0.058) (0.057)
BMI ≥ 37.5 -0.048 -0.063
(0.068) (0.073)
L.(BMI ≥ 37.5) -0.052 -0.030
(0.054) (0.053)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.910 -5.041 -5.028 -5.094 -4.994 -5.079 -5.075 -5.050
   p -value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.476 -0.483 -0.606 -0.492 -0.162 -0.379 -0.461 -0.375
   p -value 0.634 0.629 0.545 0.623 0.871 0.705 0.645 0.708
Hansen J  statistic 120.3 113.1 105.3 110.7 112.7 108.4 101.3 108.8
Hansen test p -value 0.885 0.924 0.976 0.945 0.957 0.961 0.989 0.958
Diff-in-Hansen Tests for Exogeneity of Subsets of GMM Instruments (p- value)
   ln(wage) lags 0.590 0.380 0.472 0.497 0.751 0.574 0.749 0.630
   BMI cat. Lags 0.856 0.920 0.983 0.953 0.956 0.965 0.993 0.966
…
…
…… …
… … …
Table 4. Effects of Past and Current BMI on the Log Wages of White Women
Results for Alternative BMI Categories
…
…
…
Lower Dummy Variable: BMI ≥ 24.5 Lower Dummy Variable: BMI ≥ 25
…
… …
… …
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
… …
… …
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .  There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women.    All specifications 
use lags of three BMI dummy variables as GMM instruments. (See text for further detail.) This totals to 187 instruments in columns 1 and 5, 
but the number falls to 185 in other columns because a lagged BMI > 35 is rare among the 22 women with more than 12 years since 
market entry. See Table 3 for a description of other variables included in these specifications.
… … …
… … … …… …
Preferred Dynamic Dynamic w/ OLS OLS
Specification BMI exogenous W/out Lags W/ Lags
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.1213***
(0.0412) (0.0470)
Overweight -0.1190 0.0305 0.0655*** 0.0387
(0.1207) (0.0317) (0.0166) (0.0271)
L.overwt 0.0549 0.0115 0.0371
(0.0470) (0.0312) (0.0269)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0314 -0.0652** -0.0113
(0.0925) (0.0382) (0.0266) (0.0495)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.0525 -0.0813
(0.0594) (0.0609) (0.0517)
AR(1): z -statistic -4.998 -4.746 10.57 10.59
   p- value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.568 -0.523 11.95 11.90
   p -value 0.570 0.601 < 0.001 < 0.001
Number of Instruments 196 88 … …
Hansen test (p- value) 0.803 0.766 … …
…
Table 5A.  Preferred Specification Compared to Simpler Models
White Men
… …
…
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men.  Specifications 
are as described in previous tables, except for BMI variables being treated as exogenous in the second column and the OLS 
regressions using potential experience in place of actual, as described in the text.
Preferred Dynamic Dynamic w/ OLS OLS
Specification BMI exogenous W/out Lags W/ Lags
L.ln(wage) 0.2197*** 0.3009***
(0.0528) (0.0730)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0084 -0.0602*** 0.0069
(0.0852) (0.0277) (0.0207) (0.0303)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** 0.0195 -0.0904***
(0.0431) (0.0332) (0.0302)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** 0.0615 0.0269 -0.0005
(0.0564) (0.0771) (0.0321) (0.0401)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.0099 0.0535
(0.0577) (0.0825) (0.0412)
AR(1): z -statistic -5.028 -4.904 10.48 10.54
   p- value < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001 < 0.001
AR(2): z -statistic -0.606 -0.604 7.761 7.773
   p -value 0.545 0.546 < 0.001 < 0.001
Number of Instruments 187 86 … …
Hansen test (p- value) 0.976 0.818 … …
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 .  There are 3,154 observations for 1,060 women.  
Specifications are as described in previous tables, except for BMI variables being treated as exogenous in the second column and the 
OLS regressions using potential experience in place of actual, as described in the text.
Table 5B.  Preferred Specification Compared to Simpler Models
White Women
… …
…
…
Table 6. Effects of Health Shocks on Identification in the Preferred Models
Preferred Preferred
Specification  t  only t & t -1 Specification  t  only t & t -1
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.0709* 0.0707* 0.2197*** 0.2191*** 0.2285***
(0.0412) (0.0416) (0.0414) (0.0528) (0.0541) (0.0535)
Overweight -0.1190 -0.1266 -0.1239
(0.1207) (0.1148) (0.1168)
L.Overweight 0.0549 0.0569 0.0561
(0.0470) (0.0477) (0.0476)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0311 0.0310
(0.0925) (0.0991) (0.1027)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.1708*** -0.1697***
(0.0594) (0.0645) (0.0643)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0218 0.0190
(0.0852) (0.1087) (0.1021)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** -0.0993** -0.0950**
(0.0431) (0.0423) (0.0456)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** -0.1405** -0.1499**
(0.0564) (0.0576) (0.0619)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.1084* -0.1005*
(0.0577) (0.0554) (0.0564)
Hansen J statistic, χ2(df) 130.3 129.2 129.6 105.3 106.8 108.7
   p -value 0.803 0.822 0.815 0.976 0.970 0.959
   degrees of freedom
BMI diff-in-Hansen, χ2(df 102.1 101.2 101.6 75.1 76.1 77.6
   p -value 0.738 0.758 0.749 0.983 0.978 0.971
   degrees of freedom
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men, and 3,154 
observations for 1,060 women. General Health is reported on a 5-point scale from "Excellent" (1) to "Poor" (5), with "Excellent" being the 
excluded category.
…
…
… … …
…
… …
… …
… … …
…
Differenced Health Variables Differenced Health Variables
Men Women
… …
145 136
103112
… … …
……
… … …
Occupation Occupation
Added Added
L.ln(wage) 0.0720* 0.0721* 0.2197*** 0.2170***
(0.0412) (0.0411) (0.0528) (0.0473)
Overweight -0.1190 -0.0850
(0.1207) (0.1126)
L.Overweight 0.0549 0.0510
(0.0470) (0.0463)
Severely Obese 0.0557 0.0652
(0.0925) (0.1137)
L.(Severely Obese) -0.1722*** -0.2138***
(0.0594) (0.0790)
BMI ≥ 24.5 0.0177 0.0081
(0.0852) (0.0870)
L.(BMI ≥ 24.5) -0.1039** -0.0783*
(0.0431) (0.0455)
BMI ≥ 37 -0.1305** -0.0806
(0.0564) (0.0520)
L.(BMI ≥ 37) -0.0990* -0.0553
(0.0577) (0.0540)
Difference-in-Hansen Tests for Added Occupation Instruments
   p -values … 0.430 … 0.261
… …
…
… …
… …
White Men White Women
Table 7.  Effects of Adding Occupation to the Preferred Model
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  There are 5,897 observations for 1,473 men, and 
3,154 observations for 1,060 women. Occupations are grouped into five categories with service occupations being the 
comparison group. Second lagged levels of occupation dummies are used as instruments, producing a total of 200 
instruments for men and 189 for women. 
Preferred Model Preferred Model
… …
… …
… …
… …
…
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Wage) 2.332 0.619 -3.252 10.081
ln(Wage) Difference 0.052 0.587 -6.202 6.142
Decrease in BMI cat. 0.031 0.174 0 1
Increase in BMI cat. 0.058 0.235 0 1
South 0.319 0.466 0 1
Urban 0.703 0.457 0 1
Part Time 0.071 0.257 0 1
Married 0.231 0.422 0 1
Any Children 0.272 0.445 0 1
HS 0.362 0.480 0 1
Some College 0.239 0.427 0 1
College 0.171 0.376 0 1
Local Unempl. Rate 6.314 2.734 0 27.8
Occupations
Service 0.155 0.362 0 1
Mgmt, Tech., & Prof. 0.177 0.382 0 1
Sales 0.109 0.312 0 1
Clerical, Admin. 0.088 0.284 0 1
Misc. Blue Collar 0.470 0.499 0 1
Note: As in Table 1, there are 9,037 observations used for most of these variables. Occuption summarized
where not missing. "Decrease (or Increase) in BMI cat." refers to the fraction who move to a lower (or higher)
BMI category as defined by the WHO.
Table A1.  Additional Summary Statistics for White Men
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ln(Wage) 2.196 0.563 -3.069 6.652
ln(Wage) Difference 0.044 0.488 -6.060 4.499
Decrease in BMI cat. 0.026 0.159 0 1
Increase in BMI cat. 0.051 0.220 0 1
South 0.331 0.470 0 1
Urban 0.757 0.429 0 1
Part Time 0.115 0.319 0 1
Married 0.253 0.435 0 1
Any Children 0.204 0.403 0 1
HS 0.280 0.449 0 1
Some College 0.282 0.450 0 1
College 0.319 0.466 0 1
Local Unempl. Rate 6.237 2.674 0 19.2
Occupations
Service 0.236 0.425 0 1
Mgmt, Tech., & Prof. 0.314 0.464 0 1
Sales 0.133 0.340 0 1
Clerical, Admin. 0.248 0.432 0 1
Misc. Blue Collar 0.069 0.254 0 1
Note: As in Table 1, there are 5,408 observations used for most of these variables. Occuption summarized
where not missing. "Decrease (or Increase) in BMI cat." refers to the fraction who move to a lower (or higher)
BMI category as defined by the WHO.
Table A2.  Additional Summary Statistics for White Women
